Theorems on Existence and Essence / Translated from the Latin With an Introduction and Preface By Michael V . Murray , S.J . , S .T .L . , Ph . D . Associate Professor of Pisilosophy , Marquette University
Material type:
TextLanguage: English Original language: Latin Series: Mediaeval philosophical texts in translation ; 7 | Mediaeval philosophical texts in translation ; 7Publication details: Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1973Edition: Second EditionDescription: 112 Pages ; 23 cmTitle translated: نظريات في الوجود والجوهرUniform titles: Subject(s): Other classification: - 32.1
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مكتبة الأستاذ الدكتور حسن حنفي | Prof. Hassan Hanafi Library | 32.1 053 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | C. 1 | Not for loan | 10004358 |
Includes bibliographical references (Pages - 22 - 23)
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
1. Bibliographers and Editors 1
II. The Date of Composition 5
III. The Purpose and Occasion of the Work 9
IV. The State of the Question 11
V. The Doctrine of Giles 16
VI. Bibliography 22
INDEX TO THEOREMS
Theorem 1 25
Every existence is either perfect, self-existing, and infinite, or
participating in existence, received in another, and limited.
Theorem II 27
No absolute and infinite existence can be multiplied, because
it is impossible that it be in a plurality either of number in the
same species, or of species in the same genus, or of gems in a
unity of analogy.
Theorem III 32
Self-existing forms, not received in another, can be multiplied,
although reason denies that self-existing existence, not received
in another, be multiplied.
Theorem IV 35
Every participated existence, received in another and limited,
is caused by and flows from an existence that is perfect, self-
existing and infinite.
Theorem V 35
Every immaterial and abstract form, if it possesses existence
from another, is not its own existence, but is really different
and distinct from its existence.
Theorem VI 38
The composition of essence and existence appears to be related
and to have a close resemblance to the composition of matter
and form; nevertheless, the one is not the other, and many
differences between them can be pointed out.
Theorem VII 41
Every natural agent first disposes the matter; secondly, induces
the form, and thirdly, causes existence. Consequently, it must
be concluded that existence cannot be the immediate term of
change.
Theorem VIII 46
All material things are said to possess a form of the part and
a form of the whole, and because existence is caused by the
form it would seem to follow from this that a twofold existence
is found in material things. But of there existences one is ex-
istence simply, and the other is not existence simply but it may
be called a mode of existence.
Theorem IX 50
Because immaterial substances have a simple nature and are
subsisting forms, they are not subjects of that distinction by
which the form of the part and the form of the whole are dis-
tinguished. Therefore, in these there is no place for what was
said about the twofold existence which is in material things.
Theorem X 53
All material substances are intelligible through the actuality
which they have from the form, but they exist through the
actuality which they have from their existence. They can be
known but they cannot exist without existence, but they can
be neither known nor exist without the form.
Theorem XI 57
Because all immaterial substances are subsisting forms and are
independent of matter, they are intelligible in themselves, but
they cannot exist unless on existence different from their nature
be given to them by the First Agent.
Theorem XII 61
Everything that exists, except the First Being, is not its own
existence, but it has an essence really distinct from existence
and by reason of the former it is a being and by ronson of the
latter it is an existent.
Theorem XIII 68
Leet there be an infinite regress, everything that is, except the
First Being, is a being by reason of its essence, but it exists by
an existence added to the essence or nature.
Theorem XIV 71
Every accidental form glue its abject an existence. But the
existence caused by such a form cannot be other than the
existence of the whole, since no third nature arises from the
union of the form and the subject.
Theorem XV 78
The existence which an accidental forn goes to a subject does
not produce, together with the accidental form and its subject
a substantial unity so that it can be called a third thing,
Theorem XVI 80
No existence which is caused in substances by the form of the
part produces, together with the matter and the form, a numeri
cal unity so that it can be called a third thing really distinct
from them.
Theorem XVII 86
No plurality of forms causes a produces a plurality of re
istences, but many modes of existence, or many determinations
of matter or of a subject. Wherefore, whether there be one or
many forms in a composite, there is always only one existence
in such thing.
Theorem XVIII 92
Everything which is united to an existence participates in that
existence: existence, however, cannot participate in another. If,
therefore, a plurality of existences is in a support, one will
participate in the other, consequently, the participating ex-
istence will not be that existence of which too say there is only
one existence in one and the same thing.
Theorem XIX 94
The existence which comes to a composite from the form of the
whole or which is caused by the quidity in a simple sub-
stance it not a union of the essential parts, nor a relation to
an agent, nor a determination of matter, or of a subject, but
it is an actually really distinct from and added to the quiddity,
from which existence and essence everything, except the First
Being, is composed.
Theorem XX 99
If every being, except the First Being, were not a composite
of essence and existence, and did not have an existence really
distinct from and added to the quiddity, it would necessarily
be eternal, perfect and infinite. To predicate these of a creature
is to assert that contradictories are simultaneously present in it.
Theorem XXI 103
Every essence participating in existence is determined to a
genus of itself. Existence of itself is not determined to and is
not contained within a genus; if, however, it is determined to a
genus, it is because of the essence in which it is received.
Therefore, just as existence is determined to a genus by essence,
so an essence which is the same as its existence is outside of
every genus.
Theorem XXII 108
Existence, participated in by the essence in which it is received,"
is determined to the genus of substance. Nevertheless, sub-
stance is not predicated of this existence directly either in a
generic or an analogous sense
Text in English ; translated from Latin.
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