Law and Logic : a Critical Account of Legal Argument / Joseph Horovitz
Material type:
TextLanguage: English Series: Library of Exact Philosophy ; 8Publication details: New York : Springer-Verlag , 1972Description: XV, 213 Pages ; 25 cmISBN: - 3211810668
- 0387810668
- 08.1
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مكتبة الأستاذ الدكتور حسن حنفي | Prof. Hassan Hanafi Library | 08.1 463 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | C. 1 | Not for loan | 10011489 |
Originally Presented as the Author's Thesis , Hebrew University of Jerusalem , 1965
Includes Bibliographical References and Index
General Introduction – Part - The German Discussion – Introduction – Chapter - A Pseudoformalistic Position: Klug - 1. The Concept of Legal Logic - 2. Discussion of Antilogical Doctrines. Legal Confirmation. The Background of Legal Logic - 3. Analogical Inference. (Formal) Logic and Heuristic "Logic". Creative Judgment and Semantic Interpretation - 4. Legal Inference by Inversion. The Metalegal Character of Its Conclusion - 5. Conversion of Law Into a Calculus. Legal "Teleologics" - Chapter 2 - Two Nonformalistic Positions: Engisch and Simitis - 1. Engisch on Law and Axiomatics - 2. Engisch on the Nature of Legal Knowledge - 3. Engisch's Concept of Material Legal Logic - 4. Simitis on "the Problem of Legal Logic" - Chapter 3 - An Axiologistic Position: Heller - 1. The Logicians' and the Lawyers' Analogical Inference. The Inductive Nature of Legal Argument - 2. Legal Logic Is Essentially Deontic. The Problem of Subsumption. The Intuitive Character of Legal Argument in Practice - 3. The Empirical Nature of Legal Confirmation - Conclusion and Supplementary Observations - Part II - The Belgian Discussion – Introduction - 1. Perelman and Kazemier on the Logical Specificity of Law - 2. Kalinowski's Denial of the Specificity of Legal Logic - 3. Kalinowski on Interpretation: (i) Authenticity, Meaning, and the Resolution of Contradictions - 4. Kalinowski on Interpretation: (ii) The Elimination of Lacunae - 5. Feys and Motte on "Legal Logic, Legal Systems" - 6. Perelman on "Formal Logic, Legal Logic" - 7. Gregorowicz on "the Argument a Maiori ad Minus and the Problem of Legal Logic": (i) General Stand, and Views Disavowed - 8. Gregorowicz on "the Argument a Maiori ad Minus and the Problem of Legal Logic": (ii) Views Avowed and Constructive Ideas - Conclusion and Supplementary Observations - Part III - The Discussion in the English-Speaking Countries – Introduction - 1. Stone on "Uses and Limitations of Formal Logic in Legal Reasoning" - 2. Levi: Legal Argument as a Reflection of Social Change - 3. Hart on "the Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" - 4. Hart on "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" - 5. Jensen: Legal Argument as a Nonlogical Mode of Decision - 6. Toulmin: Legal Argument as Archetype of Argument in General - 7. Hart on "Formalism and Rule-Scepticism" - Conclusion and Supplementary Observations - General Conclusion - Appendix - Concerning the Third Edition of Klug's "Juristische Logik" - List of References - Index of Names - Subject Index
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