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  <titleInfo>
    <nonSort>The </nonSort>
    <title>Uses of Argument</title>
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  <titleInfo type="translated">
    <title>استخدامات الحجة</title>
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  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Toulmin , Stephen</namePart>
    <namePart type="date">1922 - 2009</namePart>
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    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Cambridge</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher>
    <dateIssued>1969</dateIssued>
    <edition>First Paperback Edition</edition>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
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  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>vi , 264 Pages ;  22 cm</extent>
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  <tableOfContents>Preface - Introduction I. - Fields Of Argument And Modals The Phases Of An Argument Impossibilities And Improprieties Force And Criteria The Field-Dependence Of Our Standards Questions For The Agenda - Ii. Probability I Know, I Promise, Probably 'Improbable But True' Improper Claims And Mistaken Claims The Labyrinth Of Probability Probability And Expectation Probability-Relations And Probabilification Is The Word 'Probability' Ambiguous? Probability-Theory And Psychology The Development Of Our Probability-Concepts - Iii. The Layout Of Arguments The Pattern Of An Argument: Data And Warrants The Pattern Of An Argument: Backing Our Warrants Ambiguities In The Syllogism The Notion Of 'Universal Premisses' The Notion Of Formal Validity Analytic And Substantial Arguments The Peculiarities Of Analytic Arguments - Iii. The Layout Of Arguments (Cont.) Some Crucial Distinctions The Perils Of Simplicity - Iv. Working Logic And Idealised Logic An Hypothesis And Its Consequences The Verification Of This Hypothesis The Irrelevance Of Analytic Criteria Logical Modalities Logic As A System Of Eternal Truths System-Building And Systematic Necessity - V. The Origins Of Epistemological Theory Further Consequences Of Our Hypothesis Can Substantial Arguments Be Redeemed? I: Trans-Cendentalism Can Substantial Arguments Be Redeemed? Ii: Pheno-Menalism And Scepticism Substantial Arguments Do Not Need Redeeming The Justification Of Induction Intuition And The Mechanism Of Cognition The Irrelevance Of The Analytic Ideal - Conclusion References - Index. 1. Proper Names 2. Terms Introduced Or Discussed</tableOfContents>
  <targetAudience authority="marctarget">general</targetAudience>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">by Stephen Edelston Toulmin</note>
  <note>Includes Bibliographical References and Index</note>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Logic</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Reasoning</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject>
    <topic>08</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="">08.1 476</classification>
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