The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology : An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy /
= أزمة العلوم الأوروبية والظاهراتية المتعالية: مقدمة في الفلسفة الظاهراتية
Edmund Husserl ; David Carr
- Evanston : Northwestern University Press , 1970
- xliii, 405 Pages ; 24 cm
- Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy .
Translator's Introduction / XV - PART I THE CRISIS OF THE SCIENCES AS EXPRESSION OF THE RADICAL LIFE-CRISIS OF EUROPEAN HUMANITY - 1. Is there, in view of their constant successes, really a crisis of the sciences? /3 - 2. The positivistic reduction of the idea of science to mere factual science. The "crisis" of science as the loss of its meaning for life. / 5 - 3. The founding of the autonomy of European humanity through the new formulation of the idea of philosophy in the Renaissance. / 7 - 4. The failure of the new science after its initial success; the un-clarified motive for this failure. / 10 - 5. The ideal of universal philosophy and the process of its inner dissolution. - 6. The history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man. 14 - 7. The project of the investigations of this work. / 16 - PART II CLARIFICATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN OPPOSITION BETWEEN PHYSICALISTIC OBJECTIVISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVISM - 8. The origin of the new idea of the universality of science in the reshaping of mathematics. / 21 - 59. Galileo's mathematization of nature. / 23 - a. "Pure geometry." / 24 b. The basic notion of Galilean physics: nature as a mathematical universe. / 28 c. The problem of the mathematizability of the "plena." / 34 - d. The motivation of Galileo's conception of nature. - relate of a universal abstraction; the problem of "comple. mentary abstractions." / 226 - continuing historical influence of the empiricist approach (from Hobbes to Wundt). Critique of data-empiricism. / 230 - The task of a pure explication of consciousness as such: the reform of psychology.) / 233 - The basic psychological method of "phenomenological-psycho logical reduction" (first characterization: [1] intentional re latedness and the epoche; [2] levels of descriptive psychology, [3] establishing the "disinterested spectator"). / 235 - The difficulties of psychological "abstraction." (The paradox of the "intentional object", the intentional primal phenomenon of "sense." / 241 - The danger of misunderstanding the "universality of the phenomenological-psychological epoche. The decisive significance of the correct understanding. / 244 - The relation of transcendental psychology to transcendental phenomenology as the proper access to pure self-knowledge. Definitive removal of the objectivistic ideal from the science of the soul. / 257 - APPENDIXES - A. The Vienna Lecture - Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity / 269 - B. Supplementary Texts - Idealization and the Science of Reality-The Mathematization of Nature 301 - The Attitude of Natural Science and the Attitude of Humanistic Science. Naturalism, Dualism, and Psychophysical Psychology / 315 - Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason/335 - [Objectivity and the World of Experience] / 343 - [The Origin of Geometry) / 353 [The Life-World and the World of Science] / 379 - Fink's Appendix on the Problem of the "Unconscious" / 385 - Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [Must Be] Historical. How Is History Required? /389 - Fink's Outline for the Continuation of the Crisis/397 - Index
In The Crisis, universally accepted as his last great work, Husserl made what he doubtless knew would be his last attempt before his death to ground and explain his phenom-enological philosophy. Although its content and its influence on other philosophers make it a vitally important work for all those interested in phenomenology, it has hitherto been inaccessible to the English-language reader. By making use of historical considerations and a discussion of what he calls the "life-world" in his new introduction to phenomenology, Husserl makes a radical departure from his earlier works; the significance of this departure is still the focus of controversy among scholars. Merleau-Ponty, among others, has held that it constitutes a distinct break with Husserl's earlier transcendental phenomenology and that his notion of the life-world- first introduced in The Crisis - points toward a union of phenomenology and existentialism. Regardless of one's position in this controversy, it is clear that at the end of his life Husserl had caught sight of new horizons and was passionately engaged in beginning philosophy again in an effort to understand them
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Phenomenology Philosophy, Modern Science --Philosophy