04754nam a2200253 4500003000900000005001700009008004100026040003800067041000800105084001400113100005700127242003400184245008400218250002100302260004900323300002400372504005100396505300400447520097703451650001104428650001504439653000704454700003904461EG-CaHHL20261014111635.0241226s1962 enk gr 000 0 eng d aEG-NbEJUbengcEG-NbEJUdEG-NbEJU aeng a36.3b0081 aBradley , F. H. q(Francis Herbert) , d1846 - 192410aدراسات أخلاقية10aEthical Studies / cBy F. H. Bradley ; With An Introduction By Richard Wollheim aSecond Eidition  aOxford : bOxford University Press , c1962 a313 Page ; c24 Cm  a Includes bibliographical references and index aContents : Introduction - Essay I Thie Vulgar Notion Of Responsibility In Connexion With The Theories Of Free-Will And Necessity - Object Of The Inquiry - The Common Notion Of Responsibility - Irreconcilable With Freedom' - And With Rational Predic-Tion - Ground Of The Objection To Rational Prediction - Common Opinion And Necessitarianism - Irreconcilable As To Punishment And Responsibility - Reason Of This Twofold - Note A. Compulsion And Responsibility - Note B. Character, How Far Fixed - Note C. Freedom - Essay Ii Why Should I Be Moral - Question Rests On A Dogmatic Preconception - Which Is Opposed To The Moral Consciousness (61-2); And Is Unreasonable - The End Is Self-Realization (64); As Is Shown From Morality - And From Psychological Considerations - It Means Realizing Self As A Whole - And An Infinite Whole - Note To Essay Ii - Essay Iii Pleasure For Pleasure's Sake - Happiness A Vague Phrase (85-6). Common Opinion On Pleasure - Hedonism Irreconcilable With Morality (88-93). Illusory Nature Of The Hedonistic End - My Pleasure As The End Gives No Rule Of Life - And The Pleasure Of All Is Illusory - Opposed To Morality - And Gives No Practical Guidance - It Is Dogmatically Postulated - And Irreconcilable With Hedonistic Psychology - Further Modifications Of Hedonism. Qualitative Distinction Of Pleasures Is, In Both Its Forms, Untenable - Further Criticism On Mill's View- Results - Note On Mr. Sidgwick's View Of Hedonism And Utilitarianism - Note To Essay Iii - Essay Iv Duty For Duty's Sake - The End Is The Good Will - This Is The Universal Form - What 'Ought' Means - Principle Of Non-Contradiction - This Contradicts Itself - Duty And Duties - Psychological Objection - Practical Uselessness Of Non-Contradiction - Collision Of Duties Unavoidable - Essay V My Station And Its Duties - Present Result - Advance To A Higher Point Of View - Individualism Criticized - The End Is Realization As Member Of A Community - The Moral Organism Seems To Be The Solution Of Ethical Problems - Satisfactoriness Of This View - Relative And Absolute Morality - Intuitive Character Of Moral Judgements - Morality Not A Mere Private Matter - Criticism Of The Above View - Note. Rights And Duties - Ideal Morality - Essay Vi No Limit To The Moral Sphere - Content Of The Ideal Self - Collisions Of Moral Elements - Morality Not Simply Equal To Self-Realization - What It Is - Difficulties As To Its Nature - In What Sense Is It Approximative? - Essay Vii Selfishness And Self-Sacrifice - Statement And Refutation Of The Argument For General Selfishness, Which Is Founded On The Confusion As To 'Motive' - What Is The Idea Of A Pleasure? - Psychological Genesis Of The Voluptuary - What Selfishness Is - General Problem Of The Good And Bad Self - Hereditary Theory Insufficient - Content Of Good And Bad Selves - Genesis Of The Good Self - Genesis Of The Bad Self - Origin Of Morality Proper - Nature Of The Morally Good And Bad Selves - What Self-Sacrifice Is - Concluding Remarks  a'One of the most interesting aspects of Bradley's ethical philosophy is the way in which he con- stantly endeavours to relate morality and its leading ideas to the study and analysis of the mind. In this respect Bradley may have a special signi-ficance for our day. For it is a very marked feature of the moral philosophy of the recent past that it has sedulously separated questions of philosophy from questions of psychology. This has been a very important thing to do, and has resulted in the careful distinction of differences traditionally ob- scured. But now that the differences have been firmly noted, it may well be the task of the moral philosophy of the immediate future no longer to hold apart the two aspects of human behaviour, so distinguished. Moral philosophy, in other words, may revert from the tradition of Kant to that of Aristotle and Hume: if such a change is ever effected, Ethical Studies could be a benign and salutary influence upon its course.' 0aEthics 0aphilosophy a361 aWollheim , Richard , d1923 - 2003