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040 _aEG-CaHHL
_bspa
_cEG-CaHHL
_dEG-CaHHL
041 1 _aspa
_heng
042 _apremarc
084 _a36.4
_b121
100 1 _aMoore , G. E
_d1873-1958.
240 1 0 _aPrincipia ethica.
_lSpanish
242 _aالمبادئ الأخلاقية
245 1 0 _aPrincipia ethica /
_cMoore G. E
260 _a : México]
_b , Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
_c1971
300 _a218 pages
_c23 cm
490 0 _aCentro de Estudios Filosóficos. Filosofía contemporánea
505 _aTABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS. поли SECTION. 1. In order to define Ethics, we must discover what is both common and peculiar to all undoubted ethical judgments;. 2. but this is not that they are concerned with human conduct, but that they are concerned with a certain predicate 'good,' and its converse 'bad,' which may be applied both to conduct and to other things. 3. The subjects of the judgments of a scientific Ethics are not, like those of some studies, 'particular things'; . 4. but it includes all universal judgments which assert the relation of 'goodness' to any subject, and hence includes Casuistry. B. 5. It must, however, enquire not only what things are universally related to goodness, but also, what this predicate, to which they are related, is: 6. and the answer to this question is that it is indefinable 7. or simple: for if by definition be meant the analysis of an object of thought, only complex objects can be defined;. 8. and of the three senses in which 'definition' can be used, this is the most important.. 9. What is thus indefinable is not 'the good,' or the whole of that which always possesses the predicate 'good,' but this predicate itself. 10. 'Good,' then, denotes one unique simple object of thought among innumerable others; but this object has very commonly been identified with some other-a fallacy which may be called 'the naturalistic fallacy'
650 0 _aEthics.
653 _a36
901 _aa.maher
902 _aHB_05_ (44)
942 _2ddc
_n0
_cBK
999 _c1182
_d1182