000 07278cam a22003611 4500
003 EG-CaHHL
005 20261014125415.0
008 720307s1953 wiu g b 000 0 eng
040 _aEG-CaHHL
_beng
_cEG-CaHHL
041 1 _aeng
_hlat
084 _a32.1
_b053
100 1 _aGiles,
_cof Rome, Archbishop of Bourges ,
_dapproximately 1243-1316
240 1 0 _aTheoremata de esse et essentia
_lEnglish
242 _aنظريات في الوجود والجوهر
245 1 0 _aTheorems on Existence and Essence /
_cTranslated from the Latin With an Introduction and Preface By Michael V . Murray , S.J . , S .T .L . , Ph . D . Associate Professor of Pisilosophy , Marquette University
250 _aSecond Edition
260 _aMilwaukee,
_bMarquette University Press,
_c1973
300 _a112 Pages ;
_c23 cm
440 0 _aMediaeval philosophical texts in translation ;
_v7
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (Pages - 22 - 23)
505 _aCONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION 1. Bibliographers and Editors 1 II. The Date of Composition 5 III. The Purpose and Occasion of the Work 9 IV. The State of the Question 11 V. The Doctrine of Giles 16 VI. Bibliography 22 INDEX TO THEOREMS Theorem 1 25 Every existence is either perfect, self-existing, and infinite, or participating in existence, received in another, and limited. Theorem II 27 No absolute and infinite existence can be multiplied, because it is impossible that it be in a plurality either of number in the same species, or of species in the same genus, or of gems in a unity of analogy. Theorem III 32 Self-existing forms, not received in another, can be multiplied, although reason denies that self-existing existence, not received in another, be multiplied. Theorem IV 35 Every participated existence, received in another and limited, is caused by and flows from an existence that is perfect, self- existing and infinite. Theorem V 35 Every immaterial and abstract form, if it possesses existence from another, is not its own existence, but is really different and distinct from its existence. Theorem VI 38 The composition of essence and existence appears to be related and to have a close resemblance to the composition of matter and form; nevertheless, the one is not the other, and many differences between them can be pointed out. Theorem VII 41 Every natural agent first disposes the matter; secondly, induces the form, and thirdly, causes existence. Consequently, it must be concluded that existence cannot be the immediate term of change. Theorem VIII 46 All material things are said to possess a form of the part and a form of the whole, and because existence is caused by the form it would seem to follow from this that a twofold existence is found in material things. But of there existences one is ex- istence simply, and the other is not existence simply but it may be called a mode of existence. Theorem IX 50 Because immaterial substances have a simple nature and are subsisting forms, they are not subjects of that distinction by which the form of the part and the form of the whole are dis- tinguished. Therefore, in these there is no place for what was said about the twofold existence which is in material things. Theorem X 53 All material substances are intelligible through the actuality which they have from the form, but they exist through the actuality which they have from their existence. They can be known but they cannot exist without existence, but they can be neither known nor exist without the form. Theorem XI 57 Because all immaterial substances are subsisting forms and are independent of matter, they are intelligible in themselves, but they cannot exist unless on existence different from their nature be given to them by the First Agent. Theorem XII 61 Everything that exists, except the First Being, is not its own existence, but it has an essence really distinct from existence and by reason of the former it is a being and by ronson of the latter it is an existent. Theorem XIII 68 Leet there be an infinite regress, everything that is, except the First Being, is a being by reason of its essence, but it exists by an existence added to the essence or nature. Theorem XIV 71 Every accidental form glue its abject an existence. But the existence caused by such a form cannot be other than the existence of the whole, since no third nature arises from the union of the form and the subject. Theorem XV 78 The existence which an accidental forn goes to a subject does not produce, together with the accidental form and its subject a substantial unity so that it can be called a third thing, Theorem XVI 80 No existence which is caused in substances by the form of the part produces, together with the matter and the form, a numeri cal unity so that it can be called a third thing really distinct from them. Theorem XVII 86 No plurality of forms causes a produces a plurality of re istences, but many modes of existence, or many determinations of matter or of a subject. Wherefore, whether there be one or many forms in a composite, there is always only one existence in such thing. Theorem XVIII 92 Everything which is united to an existence participates in that existence: existence, however, cannot participate in another. If, therefore, a plurality of existences is in a support, one will participate in the other, consequently, the participating ex- istence will not be that existence of which too say there is only one existence in one and the same thing. Theorem XIX 94 The existence which comes to a composite from the form of the whole or which is caused by the quidity in a simple sub- stance it not a union of the essential parts, nor a relation to an agent, nor a determination of matter, or of a subject, but it is an actually really distinct from and added to the quiddity, from which existence and essence everything, except the First Being, is composed. Theorem XX 99 If every being, except the First Being, were not a composite of essence and existence, and did not have an existence really distinct from and added to the quiddity, it would necessarily be eternal, perfect and infinite. To predicate these of a creature is to assert that contradictories are simultaneously present in it. Theorem XXI 103 Every essence participating in existence is determined to a genus of itself. Existence of itself is not determined to and is not contained within a genus; if, however, it is determined to a genus, it is because of the essence in which it is received. Therefore, just as existence is determined to a genus by essence, so an essence which is the same as its existence is outside of every genus. Theorem XXII 108 Existence, participated in by the essence in which it is received," is determined to the genus of substance. Nevertheless, sub- stance is not predicated of this existence directly either in a generic or an analogous sense
546 _6Text in English ; translated from Latin.
650 0 _aOntology
650 0 _aBeing
650 0 _aPhilosophy
650 0 _aMetaphysics
653 _a32
700 1 _aMurray, Michael V.
_d1906-
_etranslator
830 _aMediaeval philosophical texts in translation ;
_v7
901 _aEsraa
902 _aBG_03_ (193)
942 _2ddc
_n0
_cBK
999 _c1868
_d1868